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Abstract 
We analyse whether public subsidies supporting collaborative research and development 
(R&D) projects in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are able to encourage persistent 
R&D investment and interorganisational networking more than subsidies supporting individual 
R&D projects. Adopting a counterfactual approach to policy evaluation, we compare subsidies 
for collaborative R&D and for individual R&D implemented in the same Italian region in the 
same period. Our findings suggest that, once public support is no longer available, the two 
subsidies have different effects on different types of SMEs. If the policymakers’ objective is to 
increase the number of R&D-performing SMEs over time, they should provide subsidies for 
collaborative R&D to firms with modest R&D experience. If their objective is to increase the 
amount of spontaneous R&D investment over time, they should target SMEs with some prior 
R&D experience, using either subsidy. Finally, if their objective is to induce SMEs to network 
with external organisations, subsidies for collaborative R&D projects should be preferred to 
subsidies for individual R&D projects. 
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1. Introduction 
Innovation policies often target small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), many of which 
lack adequate financial or human resources to undertake research and development (R&D) 
activities (Vossen, 1998; Peneder, 2008; Ortega-Argilés et al., 2009). In countries with multi-
level policy frameworks, such policies are more likely to be implemented at the regional level 
(Blanes and Busom, 2004), where interventions often pursue local development objectives. As 
a consequence, many regional innovation policies aim not only to support the R&D efforts of 
the most dynamic SMEs, but also to expand the range of SMEs that perform some amount of 
R&D. This dual objective is typical of lagging economies as well as of more advanced ones: 
even in the latter, in fact, many SMEs do not innovate at all and, among those that do, many 
engage in forms of innovation that are not necessarily based on R&D (Som 2012). 
Policymakers can pursue the dual objective to support dynamic SMEs’ R&D efforts and 
encourage more SMEs to take up R&D activities through different policy instruments, 
including subsidies, tax-credits, loans or consultancies. We focus on subsidies and, in 
particular, on two distinct approaches to delivering them. On the one hand, policymakers can 
provide SMEs with subsidies for individual R&D projects, in order to overcome the financial 
hurdles that prevent them from engaging in R&D activities or limit the amount of their R&D 
investment. Until recently, this is by far the most common approach. On the other hand, 
policymakers can grant subsidies to SMEs that perform collaborative R&D projects with 
external organisations (such as universities, public bodies, other firms or others), a more 
complex form of support that mixes financial and behavioural incentives. Besides providing 
financial support, these policies stimulate SMEs to internalise spillovers, pool resources and 
share costs (Hagedoorn et al., 2000). By encouraging collaboration, policymakers aim to 
address network failures that can occur whenever firms’ lack of linkages with other 
organisations leads to an insufficient development of complementarities, learning processes, 
and creation of new ideas, or when firms are trapped in relational and knowledge lock-ins 
(Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997; Nooteboom, 2000; Hagedoorn et al., 2000; Hekkert and Negro, 
2009). This can be particularly important for SMEs, which are often constrained by limited 
internal resources (Nooteboom, 1994).  
R&D collaboration policies have gained popularity in recent years (Metcalfe and Georghiou, 
1997; Rahm et al., 2000). However, despite their growing international diffusion, there is still 
little empirical evidence regarding their ability to support R&D and networking both in absolute 
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terms and compared with other more established approaches, such as subsidies to individual 
R&D.  
Several recent studies comparing the effects of different R&D policies have either contrasted 
policies implemented at different government levels (Marzucchi and Montresor, 2013; Huergo 
and Moreno, 2017), or compared R&D subsidies and R&D tax-credits (Hægeland and Møen, 
2007; Busom et al., 2014; Garza et al., 2015). To the best of our knowledge, a comparative 
evaluation of subsidies for individual and collaborative R&D projects has not yet been 
performed. 
Focusing on SME innovation policy, our contribution aims to address this gap and to stimulate 
further debate on the topic. In particular, we analyse whether subsidies for SMEs to perform 
collaborative R&D projects are more or less able than subsidies for SMEs’ individual R&D 
projects to stimulate R&D and networking effects after the subsidised project is completed. The 
term ‘R&D effects’ refers to the increase in R&D investment induced by the receipt of public 
aid (David and Hall, 2000). From a social viewpoint, this can be achieved both through an 
increase in R&D investment by all firms, including those that were already R&D performers, 
and through an increase in the number of R&D performers (Gonzales et al, 2005; Arqué-
Castells and Mohnen, 2015; Garza et al., 2015). In what follows we will consider both aspects. 
The network effects – which is part of the broader notion of behavioural additionality (Buisseret 
et al., 1995; Autio et al., 2008) – refers to the increase in collaborations with external 
organisations induced by the receipt of public aid (Georghiou and Clarysse, 2006; Falk, 2007; 
Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 2008).  
A striking result emerging from the previous literature is that individual R&D subsidies can 
support networking (Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 2008; Antonioli et al., 2014). Therefore, one 
might wonder whether subsidies for collaborative R&D are really needed to boost firms’ 
networking propensity, or whether individual R&D subsidies may be sufficient for this purpose. 
Our study can potentially contribute to improving policy design besides advancing general 
knowledge of comparative policy effects.  
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we put forward an interpretative framework to 
guide us in the analysis of the comparative effects of the two policies. Section 3 describes in 
some detail the empirical object of the analysis: two different policy interventions – one being 
a subsidy for collaborative R&D projects and the other a subsidy for individual R&D projects. 
Both interventions were implemented in the same region (Tuscany, Italy), in the same 
programming period (2000-2006), by the same public authority (the regional government), and 
targeted the same types of beneficiaries (SMEs). Section 4 presents data and variables, and 
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Section 5 explains our empirical strategy, which uses a matching approach applied to the case 
of multiple treatments, as proposed by Lechner (2002a, 2002b). So far, this approach has not 
been adopted in relation to enterprise and innovation policies. Sections 6 and 7 present and 
discuss the results. Finally, Section 8 concludes with policy implications and proposed avenues 
for further research. 
 
 
2. Interpretative framework and resulting hypotheses 
 
It has been argued that R&D subsidies can increase aggregate R&D in two (non mutually 
exclusive) ways: they can increase the number of firms performing R&D (extensive margin) or 
the R&D investment made by any firm (intensive margin) (Gonzalez et al, 2005; Arqué-Castells 
and Mohnen, 2015; Garza et al., 2015). Arqué-Castells and Mohnen (2015) suggest that R&D 
subsidies can stimulate the increase in R&D over one or the other margin depending on their 
size. Subsidies that are large enough to cover the cost of initiating R&D activities (i.e. the entry 
threshold, which is rather high due to the presence of sunk costs) can affect the extensive 
margin, while subsidies above the continuation threshold – which is lower than the entry 
threshold – can affect the intensive margin.  
Other contributions suggest that different types of policy instruments have different effects on 
R&D increases over the intensive or the extensive margin. Comparisons between R&D tax-
credits and individual subsidies (Busom et al., 2014; Garza et al., 2015) find that, because of 
their greater simplicity and flexibility, tax-credits are better able to increase R&D investment 
on the part of R&D-performing firms that do not suffer from serious financing constraints and, 
therefore, would not need to receive the aid in advance. Instead, subsidies are more attractive 
for financially-constrained firms such as SMEs and suited to encourage both R&D entry and 
higher R&D investment. 
What type of subsidy - to individual or collaborative R&D projects – works better remains an 
open question, especially if we are interested in assessing the effectiveness of such subsidies 
with respect to their legacy effects (Roper and Hewitt-Dundas, 2014). In our study, we 
investigate the effects of the programmes on firms’ later R&D behaviour, in a time where public 
aid is no longer available. At this time, the main effect that can be investigated is R&D 
persistence: the extent to which firms that received the subsidy continue to perform R&D. In 
this context, the definition of extensive and intensive margin put forward by the previous 
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literature needs to be adjusted: one might view persistence effects as a matter of higher 
probability of performing R&D (extensive margin), or as a matter of higher R&D investment 
(intensive margin) during the unsubsidised follow-up period. As we will explain in what 
follows, this distinction is relevant because we argue that the two policies we focus on can have 
different effects on the different margins. 
There are a number of reasons for focusing on R&D persistence, particularly when analysing 
SMEs. It is known that SMEs tend to carry out, if any, informal R&D activities (Kleinknecht 
and Reijnen, 1991), often in an intermittent and semi-structured way (Rammer et al., 2009). 
This approach limits the accumulation of internal R&D skills over time, increasing SMEs’ 
dependence on the inflows of external knowledge and know-how, which are subject to search, 
screening and other transaction costs (Fontana et al., 2006), and may ultimately result in 
discontinuous R&D practice (Rammer et al., 2009). The presence of persistence effects 
suggests that a policy has been able to encourage SMEs to engage in R&D more continuously, 
independently from future subsidisation programmes. As argued by Klette and Møen (2012), 
positive effects may be expected to arise after a time lag has passed due to the fact that the 
implementation of the subsidised project can induce learning-by-doing in R&D activities, and 
thus change the firms’ future profit opportunities in favour of more R&D-intensive products.  
 
2.1. Effects on R&D 
Both in the case of policies supporting collaborative R&D projects and of those supporting 
individual R&D projects, the subsidy may help SMEs carry out R&D activities and learn from 
the project. Thanks to experiential learning processes, employees and managers can develop 
new or improved skills and increase their capacity to interpret different aspects of the creative 
process, which can drive change in company routines (Cyert and March, 1963; Clarysse et al, 
2009). Moreover, during the project’s development, the firm can build or acquire some 
innovation infrastructures or equipment, which can be used in future innovation projects. Once 
the subsidised project is over, new and improved knowledge, skills, capabilities, routines, and, 
possibly, equipment and infrastructures, improve the value of the firm’s future innovation 
projects and therefore can increase the probability that it will continue to invest in R&D with 
its own funds (Clarysse et al., 2009; Roper and Hewitt-Dundas, 2014). The increase in 
absorptive capacity that results from new and improved skills can strengthen this effect (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1989). As investing in R&D has become less costly, the SME can even decide 
to increase the amount invested. However, the effect on the amount invested is more uncertain 
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because, for example, there could be an “optimal” project dimension that the SME, even for 
organizational or cognitive reasons, can manage (Bocci and Mariani, 2015).  
R&D collaboration subsidies combine financial and behavioural incentives, since they are 
designed to trigger interorganisational learning. 1 An important prerequisite for triggering 
interorganisational learning processes is that the firm has internal skills, capabilities, routines 
and governance systems that allow or facilitate collaborative work with external organisations 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998), which is not always the case in SMEs (Nooteboom, 1994; Van Gils 
and Zwart, 2004; Teirlinck and Spithoven, 2013). These knowledge and skills are difficult to 
learn, because their partly uncodified nature can hamper their diffusion to third parties (Polanyi, 
1966; Howells, 1996; Kale et al., 2000). The collaborative work that develops during the 
subsidised project can instead facilitate such diffusion, as far as it facilitates the development 
of interorganisational trust (Dogdson, 1992, 1993). Public funding can support either the 
experimentation with brand-new collaborative practices or the fine-tuning of existing ones, 
which can be used in future activities. After the end of the subsidised project, the firm will find 
it more useful and less costly to collaborate with external organisations. This is particularly 
important in environments where collaboration is crucial for competitiveness (Baldwin and 
Clark, 2000; Chesbrough et al., 2006), and particularly for SMEs, which can rely on relatively 
scarce internal resources and competencies (Narula, 2004; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Lee et al., 
2010). An SME that has learned how to collaborate with external partners knows how to access 
and manage the different pieces of knowledge and skills that are needed to carry out an R&D 
project (van de Vrande et al., 2009) and therefore will be more likely to continue to perform 
R&D activities. 
This effect can be strengthened by the fact that the collaborative work that takes place during 
the funded project can facilitate the sharing of other knowledge and skills that would otherwise 
be difficult to transmit and absorb such as, for example, partners’ strategies or expectations 
(e.g. with respect to the development of a certain sector or a certain technology), or information 
about the capabilities and reliability of customers, suppliers or other organizations that play an 
important role in a certain sector  or technology (Powell, 1996). Although this knowledge and 
information are not of primary importance for R&D, they can facilitate the development of such 
                                                 
 
1Obviously, nothing prevents a firm that receives a subsidy for individual R&D from using the subsidy to purchase 
external knowledge, if the firm is aware of such need. However, this type of policy requires that most of the activity 
is carried out within the boundaries of the firm. 
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activities in SMEs, which have a relatively small human capital pool, few managers and little 
resources to be invested in searching and screening of the external context (Vossen, 1998). 
Therefore, we put forward the following hypothesis concerning persistent R&D effects along 
the extensive margin:  
 
H1: The probability to continue to invest in R&D is higher for firms receiving subsidies for a 
collaborative R&D project than for firms receiving subsidies for an individual R&D project 
 
If - as we believe - there is higher probability of R&D persistence due to the subsidy, we may 
conclude that, from an aggregate perspective, the programme has succeeded in extending the 
pool of SMEs that perform R&D without public subsidy (extensive margin). Given that 
identifying and finding external partners and managing R&D activities may have become less 
costly, SMEs may decide to invest increasing amounts in R&D. However, as stated above, this 
effect is rather uncertain as SMEs could continue to manage R&D projects of relatively small 
size (Bocci and Mariani, 2015). Therefore, we do not state a hypothesis concerning persistent 
R&D effects along the intensive margin. 
 
2.2. Effects on networking 
Based on the previous arguments, SMEs that have participated in the policy supporting 
collaborative R&D should be more likely to continue to collaborate in the future with external 
organizations than SMEs that have participated in the policy subsidising individual R&D 
projects. For this reason, we put forward the following hypothesis concerning persistent 
network effects: 
 
H2: Ex-post networking effects are higher for firms receiving subsidies for a collaborative R&D 
project than for firms receiving an individual R&D subsidy 
 
In particular, networking effects may differ according to different types of partners. SMEs are 
known to find it particularly difficult to initiate interactions with universities and public 
research organisations (Mohnen and Hoareau, 2003; Arundel and Geuna, 2004; Laursen and 
Salter, 2004), due to their large cognitive and organisational distance. SMEs and public research 
organisations in fact are characterised by different cultures and languages (Bruneel et al.,  2010; 
Lockett and Wright, 2005; Sauermann and Stephan, 2013; Russo and Rossi, 2009), approaches 
to innovation (Barnes et al., 2002), and research orientation (Petruzzelli and Rotolo, 2015). 
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Moreover, SMEs often possess few spare resources in order to attempt to overcome these 
obstacles. Therefore, collaborative R&D subsidies may be particularly helpful in order to 
encourage SMEs to interact with universities, rather than with other types of firms with whom 
SMEs might interact more easily even in the absence of subsidies. 
Once again, we refer to the probability of adopting a certain behaviour (in this case, a 
networking behaviour) and not to a purely additional effect. Indeed, the latter would require 
SMEs to increase the number of external organisations they collaborate with, while we do not 
posit that SMEs will always expand their network. At the same time, SMEs will not necessarily 
continue to collaborate with the same organizations they previously collaborated with (Caloffi 
et al., 2017). The fact of having experienced collaborative work and having adapted their 
internal routines to collaboration makes collaboration easier for the SMEs that participated in 
R&D collaboration policies than those who participated in the other policy under analysis.  
To test the hypotheses H1 and H2 it would be insufficient to estimate the effects of the two 
policies with respect to a counterfactual, no-policy situation and compare them. To estimate the 
differential effect of one policy versus the other, we need to account for the fact that firms that 
decide to participate in one type of policy programme are not necessarily the same that decide 
to participate in the other type of programme. Our empirical strategy will be described in section 
5. 
 
3. Tuscany’s regional policy in support of R&D 
Our empirical analysis focuses on two distinct R&D policy interventions targeting SMEs that 
were implemented in an Italian region (Tuscany) in the programming period 2000-2006 (2002-
2008 is the actual period of implementation) using European Regional Development Funds. 
Since the constitutional reform of 2001, Italian regions were conferred a number of 
competencies related to enterprise and innovation policy, based on the idea that peripheral 
governments should respond to local needs better than the central government (Caloffi and 
Mariani, 2018).  
Similarly to several other Italian regions, Tuscany is characterised by a relatively low aggregate 
level of private R&D investment and a very high share of SMEs, mostly belonging to low and 
medium-tech sectors (Hollanders and Es-Sadki, 2017). However, unlike other Italian regions, 
Tuscany has adopted a dual approach to SME innovation policy from the outset. It implemented 
both classical subsidies to individual R&D projects, as well as subsidies for collaborative R&D 
projects, the latter inspired by the Regional Innovation System framework which has gained 
popularity since the late 1990s (Cooke et al., 1997; Russo and Rossi, 2009). Both policies were 
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designed and implemented by the same policymaker, in the same time frame and with the same 
funds, and aimed to support relatively small R&D projects carried out by SMEs. The similarity 
between the ultimate objectives of the two programmes was apparent from the official 
programming documents and calls for applications, and was confirmed by the policymakers we 
interviewed.2 Both programmes resorted to the same instrument: an R&D subsidy delivered 
under the de minimis clause.3 However, one policy provided subsidies for individual firms to 
perform their own R&D projects, while the other subsidised projects carried out by temporary 
consortia or associations between SMEs and other organisations, such as universities, research 
centres, or innovation intermediaries (Howells, 2006, Russo and Rossi 2009). The latter 
intervention was premised on the assumption that the inclusion of these supposedly more 
knowledgeable organisations would mainly benefit participating SMEs. Therefore, it makes 
sense to evaluate the impact of the policy on SMEs, rather than on the other participants. Almost 
all the participants in the R&D collaboration policy were regional organisations. Extra-regional 
organisations could join the projects, but without receiving any subsidy. 
In both policies under analysis, public funding took the form of a non-repayable subsidy, which 
was granted conditional on the positive evaluation, by a committee of field experts, of the 
innovative projects presented by firms in response to public tenders. The final admission 
decision was based solely on project quality. The quality requirements set by the regional 
government were related to the degree of novelty of the project, the technical ability of the firm 
(or the consortium) to carry it out, the market potential and the potential spillovers of the project. 
Both policies had very broad sector and technology targets, which ranged from the traditional 
“made in Italy” (e.g.: textiles, jewellery) to high-tech manufacturing, and included also selected 
types of services.  
                                                 
 
2 The first interviews to policymakers were made in 2001 and other meetings followed during and after the 
implementation of the two programmes, also to acquire data on the participating firms. Over time, we have 
interviewed face-to-face the whole staff that managed the programmes (5 public officers and their director), asking 
them information about the objectives that the regional government wanted to pursue with these programmes, their 
implementation process as well as on the broader policy framework in which these programmes were inserted. 
3 The “de minimis” rule, first set by the European Commission in 1992, is designed to benefit small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs). At the time of the policies investigated in this paper, the rule provided that subsidies of 
less than € 100,000 granted to a firm over a period of 3 years did not constitute “State Aid” within the meaning of 
the EC Treaty’s ban on aid liable to distort competition (Article 87). The cumulation of such small subsidies was 
possible up to the ceiling of  € 200,000. 
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As both policies admitted multiple participations (either over time – i.e. to different calls for 
funding opened over the years – or, for the collaborative R&D subsidies, in multiple concurrent 
partnerships), we restrict our analysis to SMEs receiving a subsidy only once. As the effects of 
multiple subsidies could be additive, this choice is motivated by the wish to keep things as clear 
as possible. The implication of this choice is that inference will be valid for firms – the 
overwhelming majority in both programmes – receiving only one subsidy. We also excluded 
from the analysis those firms that received the subsidy from 2006 onwards, as the investment 
outcomes of such firms might have been later affected by the economic crisis. Hence, we start 
from a set of 292 SMEs that received only one subsidy for a collaborative R&D project, and 
from a set of 120 firms that received only one subsidy for an individual R&D project.    
 
4. Data and outcome variables 
The data for our study refer not only to the two sets of firms that participated in the two policy 
programmes under investigation, but also to a third, and wider, set of firms that did not 
participate in either of the two programmes. The inclusion in the analysis of this latter set of 
firms will be motivated in Section 5.   
For each of these three sets of firms, we collected the relevant data using administrative sources 
and surveys. Time-varying data refer to two different time points. In particular, information on 
the firms’ background characteristics refers to one year before the start of the subsidised project, 
whereas information on the outcomes of interest refers to 2 years after the completion of the 
subsidised project. As the duration of projects under both programmes was about 1 year, the 
time distance between treatment and outcome was approximately 3 years. 
Based on the discussion presented in Section 3 and on the hypotheses therein, in order to 
measure the effects of the policies we chose to focus on the following five outcome variables, 
all measured after the completion of the subsidised project: (1) a binary variable called R&D 
equal to one if the firm performs internal R&D, and zero otherwise; (2) a continuous variable 
with the amount of the firm’s R&D investment4; (3) a binary variable called Collaborations 
equal to one if the firm was involved in R&D collaboration with external organisations (either 
universities or other firms), and zero otherwise; a couple of variables detailing the type of 
                                                 
 
4The values of R&D investment are expressed at constant prices, base year is 2001. To this end we employed the 
R&D investment deflator provided by the Italian National Institute of Statistics. 
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partners in R&D collaboration, and, in particular (4) a binary variable called Universities equal 
to one if the firm was involved in R&D collaboration with universities or other research 
organisations, and zero otherwise; (5) a binary variable called Other Firms equal to one if the 
firm was involved in R&D collaboration with other firms, and zero otherwise. 
The outcome variables of interest had to be collected through an ad hoc survey since they are 
mostly unavailable in balance-sheet data.5 The survey also offered the opportunity to collect 
information on the outcome variables prior to the programme. Information on time-invariant 
characteristics, such as legal form, sector and province, as well as on the number of employees 
prior to the programme, was drawn from the Statistical Archive of Active Enterprises (ASIA), 
maintained by the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). 
Whereas the list of subsidised firms was provided by the regional government implementing 
the two programmes, completely untreated firms belonging to eligible sectors were hundreds 
of thousands in the region, far too many to be all surveyed. In order to identify a manageable 
set of untreated firms that could be used as controls, we adopted a matched sampling approach 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). This strategy is based on the estimation of a preliminary 
propensity score, one for each programme, from a number of basic background characteristics 
available on the full population of eligible regional enterprises, such as those available in the 
ASIA archive mentioned earlier (number of employees, legal form, sector and province). Based 
on these preliminary propensity scores, we selected a pool of untreated firms by matching each 
beneficiary to its five nearest neighbours, without replacement. 
We then launched the telephone survey to all beneficiary firms and to their matched potential 
controls. The questionnaire was submitted in 2010 to the 120 firms that received only one 
subsidy for individual R&D projects and to their potential controls, and in 2014 to the 292 firms 
that received only one subsidy for collaborative R&D projects prior to 2006 and to their 
potential controls. The interviews were with the entrepreneur or a manager who had been 
involved in the subsidised R&D projects (for treated firms) or who was responsible for R&D 
activities. Only 189 beneficiary SMEs responded: all 120 firms that received the subsidy to 
individual R&D, and 69 firms that received the subsidy to collaborative R&D.6 However, the 
                                                 
 
5 The value of R&D investment collected through the interview was later cross-checked in balance sheets.  
6All contacted firms received a written invitation to respond by the regional government. In the survey aimed at 
SMEs that received the subsidy for individual R&D projects and their potential controls, we could also rely on the 
crucial support of local business associations. Unfortunately, the support of business associations was not available 
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subset of respondents is rather similar, in a range of basic background characteristics, to the 
two full populations of beneficiary firms, which suggests that the response rate is uncorrelated 
with such observables and that there could be more individual reasons for non-response (Bloom 
and Van Reenen, 2010).7 
All background variables (henceforth also covariates) are listed in Table 1, along with their 
means in the two sets of firms that received the collaborative or the individual R&D subsidy, 
and in the two sets of related (untreated) controls. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
From Table 1, we see that firms under the two programmes had partially different background 
characteristics before they received the subsidies. In fact, firms that went on to receive the 
subsidy to collaborative R&D projects were already more likely to have relationships with 
external partners.8 On the other hand, firms that went on to receive the subsidy to individual 
R&D projects had already a higher propensity to engage in internal R&D.9 
 
 
5. Empirical strategy 
We view our estimation problem in the light of the potential-outcomes framework (Imbens and 
Rubin, 2015). For each firm there are three potential outcomes for each outcome variable Y: the 
value of Y if the firm receives a subsidy for a collaborative R&D project, Yi(c); the value of Y 
if the firm receives a subsidy for an individual R&D project, Yi(s); and the value of Y if the firm 
does not receive a subsidy at all, Yi(u). For each firm i, the effect of the subsidy for a 
                                                 
 
when we later surveyed SMEs that received the subsidy for collaborative R&D projects, which explains the much 
lower response rate achieved with these firms. 
7  Descriptive statistics on the main background characteristics of responding and non-responding firms are 
available upon request to the authors.  
8 Firms that, prior to policy participation, collaborated with universities and other firms are 22% of those receiving 
subsidies to collaborative R&D, and 9% of those receiving subsidies to individual R&D. 
9 These pre-treatment differences between firms participating in the two programmes are confirmed by tests on 
the equality of proportions, where the null hypothesis of equality is always rejected. On the other hand, the p-value 
associated to the test on the equality of means of the pre-treatment amount of R&D investment does not allow to 
reject the null hypothesis of equality. The detailed results of the previous tests are available upon request to the 
authors. 
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collaborative project relative to a no-subsidy situation can be defined as the difference between 
the firm’s two potential outcomes, Yi(c)-Yi(u), whereas  the effect of the subsidy for a 
collaborative project relative to a subsidy for an individual project can be  defined as the 
difference between the firm’s two potential outcomes, Yi(c)-Yi(s), and so forth for each pair of 
the possible treatment levels Ti=(c,s,u). Unfortunately, only the potential outcome associated 
with the treatment actually received is observable, whereas the two counterfactual potential 
outcomes are not. Therefore, attention shifts to estimable average quantities and to the contrast 
between these quantities. Outside of experiments, the comparison between the average Y 
relative to groups of units receiving different treatments returns causal effects provided that 
some untestable assumptions are made. Given the data at hand, we choose to invoke the 
assumption of strong ignorability, which was extended to the multiple-treatment case by 
Lechner (2002a; 2002b) and consists of two components: 
(i) Unconfoundedness:  Yi(u),Yi(c),Yi(s)⊥Ti|Xi , where Xi  is a vector of pre-treatment covariates 
observed for each firm i,  i.e. treatment assignment is independent of the potential outcomes 
conditional on the observed pre-treatment covariates; 
(ii) Overlap: 0<Pr( Ti=t| Xi=x)<1 , i.e. the treatment status is not a deterministic function of 
the covariates and, therefore, there is room for ceteris paribus comparisons. 
The plausibility of unconfoundedness heavily relies on the quality and on the amount of the 
information contained in the vector X. It is particularly important that such information includes 
the pre-treatment values of the outcome variables of interest, as these are likely to be good 
predictors of the outcomes themselves (Heckman et al., 1997).  
For each generic pair of treatments l and m, the main causal estimand of interest is the average 
treatment effect of l for the subpopulation of firms receiving l rather than m, known as average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT). Under the assumption of strong ignorability, such ATT 
can be written as follows:  
         ATTl,m=E[Yi(l)-Yi(m)|T=l,Xi=x].  [1] 
 
In our context of application, the way the causal estimands presented above may be interpreted 
depends on what types of treatments l and m are (Table 2). If, for example, l=c and m=u, then 
[1] is the effect of the subsidy for a collaborative project relative to no subsidy for firms that 
participate in the collaborative programme. If l=s and m=u, [1] is the effect of the subsidy to 
an individual project relative to no subsidy for firms that participate in the programme for 
individual R&D projects. If, instead, l=c and m=s, [1] is the effect of the subsidy to a 
collaborative project relative to the subsidy to an individual project for firms that actually take 
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the former. Finally, if l=s and m=c, [1] is the effect of the subsidy to an individual project 
relative to the subsidy to collaborative projects for firms that actually take the former. 
Under the assumption of strong ignorability and in the presence of multiple treatments, the 
previous causal effects can be semi-parametrically estimated by means of propensity-score 
matching (Lechner 2002a, 2002b). The propensity score is a univariate summary of the 
information contained in the vector of pre-treatment covariates. For each pair of treatments l 
and m, the propensity score is defined as 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖
𝑙𝑙,𝑚𝑚=Pr(Ti=l|Xi, T=l,m). This summary has two 
important properties (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983): (i) it is a balancing score, in the sense that 
it theoretically guarantees that observations with the same value of the propensity score have 
the same distribution of observable characteristics independently of the treatment; (ii) if 
treatment assignment is strongly ignorable given Xi, then it is also strongly ignorable given the 
propensity score. The two properties together make it possible to match firms from different 
treatment groups using this univariate summary instead of the original covariates. In order to 
facilitate the estimation of a propensity score that satisfies the previous property (i), Imai and 
Ratkovic (2014) have recently proposed a generalised-method-of-moments estimator of the 
propensity score where a single model determines both the conditional probability of treatment 
assignment and optimised covariate balancing weights. A key advantage of this methodology 
is that it mitigates the harm deriving from a potential misspecification of a parametric 
propensity score, because the coefficients of the propensity score model are estimated 
maximising the covariate balance. Therefore, we resort to this powerful covariate-balancing 
propensity score (CBPS) estimator in our study. The covariates we insert in the CBPS models, 
one for each pair of treatment groups, are all the background characteristics defined in Table 1. 
They include the pre-treatment values of all outcome variables (including the deflated value of 
R&D investment), a categorical variable for the sector of the firm, a categorical variable for 
firm size, a dummy for the firm’s legal form and a categorical variable for the province in which 
the firm is located. The coefficients of the propensity score models are reported in Table A in 
the Appendix. After having ascertained that the estimated CBPSs always guarantee that the 
overlap assumption is satisfied in practice, we evaluate to which extent they also imply a 
satisfactory covariate balance. Following Imbens and Rubin (2015) and the previous 
methodological field literature, we perform this assessment by looking at normalised mean 
differences before and after conditioning on the estimated propensity scores (Table B in the 
Appendix). Such conditioning may take place by using propensity-score-based balancing 
weights (Imai and Ratkovic, 2014). With respect to the unconditional contrast between the 
mean level of pre-treatment covariates in each pair of treatment groups, once we condition on 
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the estimated CBPSs we have considerable improvements in covariate balance. This 
notwithstanding, small differences persist in some of the pre-treatment values of outcome 
variables. We choose to address these residual differences in the pre-treatment values of all 
outcomes using the bias-corrected matching estimator by Abadie and Imbens (2011) that 
combines nearest-neighbour matching (based, in our case, on the propensity score as distance 
metric) with a correction factor calculated using a regression model for the outcome variable in 
the group of matched controls.10,11 
We match each treated firm only to its nearest-neighbour, allowing for the replacement of 
controls.  Variability estimation occurs using the analytic asymptotic variance estimator by 
Abadie and Imbens (2006), which focuses on cases, like ours, where matching occurs with 
replacement and with a fixed number of matches. 
To tackle the problem of non-response of some firms that took the subsidy to collaborative 
R&D projects, we adopted an inverse probability weighting strategy (Wooldridge, 2007; 
Rotnitzky, 2009).12 Under the assumption that there are no unmeasured confounders for both 
treatment and loss to follows-up due to non-response, in the estimation of the ATTcu and the 
ATTcs we apply the nearest neighbour estimator to outcomes weighed by the inverse of the 
probability of response. In so doing, the contribution of each treated respondent is directly 
proportional to the “rarity” of information provided by the same respondent. Each control unit 
receives the weight of the treated firm to which it is matched. 
Specifically, let Ri, be a binary indicator equal to 1 if firm i responds to the survey. The weight 
for each treated respondent is constructed as follows: 
wi, T=c,=1/Pr(Ri= 1 | Xi, Ti=c),   
                                                 
 
10 After conditioning on the propensity score ecs = Pr(T=c | X, T=c,s), some unbalance persists between the proportion 
of PPLC in the group of firms for which T=c and the proportion of PPLC in the group of firms for which T=s 
(Table B in the Appendix). Therefore, when estimating the ATTc,s, we also adjust for the residual difference in the 
legal form. 
11 When the outcome variable is binary, bias correction occurs through a linear probability model. 
12 The premise for the adoption of this strategy is that non-response does not depend on the outcome variable 
(Little and Rubin, 2014). Indeed, we believe that the information collected through the questionnaire is not so 
sensitive as to push companies to not respond. On the other hand, we cannot rule out that the respondents’ selection 
process is not completely random. Under these circumstances, it makes sense to assume that non-response occurs 
at random conditional on a vector of observable variables, including those used for estimating the propensity score. 
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where Xi contains the covariates that are available for all treated firms, be they respondent or 
not (sector, province, legal form, number of employees prior to the programme).The probability 
contained in the previous equation was estimated using a logit model. 
 
 
6. Results  
We present now our estimates of the average treatment effect on the treated defined in Section 
5.  
Let us start by comparing the outcomes achieved under each of the two policies with the 
outcomes the same firms would achieve in the counterfactual no-policy scenario (Table 2, 3rd 
and 4th columns). Then, we move to the direct comparison of the two policies (Table 2, 5th and 
6th columns). 
The subsidies to collaborative R&D projects were effective in stimulating persistent networking 
behaviour in the firms that received them (henceforth, we call these C-type firms), and in 
increasing their propensity to engage in unsubsidised R&D activities later on, while the 
subsidies to individual R&D projects raised the amount of investment in R&D in the recipient 
firms (henceforth, we call these S-type firms) in the unsubsidised follow-up period. In 
particular, after the end of the policies, the probability to collaborate with external partners of 
C-type firms is 14% higher than it would have been without the collaboration subsidy, and their 
probability to collaborate with universities is 21% higher. On the other hand, it seems that the 
subsidies for collaborative R&D did not substantially raise their probability of networking with 
other firms over time. This is in line with the idea, suggested by the literature recalled in the 
second section, that networking with this latter type of partner is not unlikely to occur 
spontaneously, while networking with universities can be facilitated by public support. Besides 
increasing their willingness to engage in subsequent innovation-related interactions with 
research organisations, participation in the R&D collaboration policy induced a change in 
firms’ behaviour towards R&D activities.  
Indeed, the causal effect of the subsidy to collaborative projects on the probability of 
performing any unsubsidised, internal R&D in the follow-up period is almost 18%, whereas its 
effect on the amount of R&D investment is statistically insignificant. This suggests that the 
subsidy to collaborative R&D may induce former non performers to continue to invest in R&D 
also beyond the time horizon of the subsidised project, but also that such later investments are 
not necessarily high. Such an inducement effect was not found for firms receiving the subsidy 
to individual R&D projects, the vast majority of which already performed some R&D prior to 
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programme participation. However, the latter subsidy was able to increase the amount of future 
R&D investment by around 64 thousand euro annually. 
To evaluate which policy is more effective, it would not be correct to compare directly the two 
ATTs commented so far, as the participants in the two policies are partially different. To this 
end, we must go a step further (Table 2, 5th and 6th columns, as explained in Section 4) and 
perform ceteris paribus comparisons between the two. 
The causal effect of the subsidy to collaborative R&D on its recipients was to increase by about 
13% the probability of subsequently performing unsubsidised R&D activities (5th column). 
However, no significant effect is found in the amount of R&D investment or on networking 
behaviour of the C-type firms. On the contrary, if we look at S-type firms, we find that the 
probability of having subsequent relationships either with universities or with other firms 
decreased by about 30% (35% for universities and 37% for other firms). On the other hand, S-
type firms would not have experienced any significant change in R&D had they participated in 
the other policy. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Summarizing, we cannot univocally confirm neither hypothesis H1 nor hypothesis H2 without 
accounting for the type of firms that receive the two different types of R&D subsidies. This is, 
in our view, the most interesting part of the story, which will be further discussed in the next 
Section. 
Before advancing any interpretation, in what follows we briefly assess the risk that the previous 
findings are false positives. Indeed, when one performs multiple tests on the same data, some 
of these tests may appear statistically significant purely by chance. To address this issue, we 
take the approach by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) based on false discovery rates (FDR). A 
FDR is the maximum proportion that one is willing to accept of apparently significant results 
(discoveries) being false positives.  
The statistical significance of all our estimated treatment effects is preserved by setting the FDR 
at 25%, which entails that, in general, it is unlikely that our discoveries are false positives. In 
particular, when we consider l=s and m=u, a FDR of 25% is required to preserve the statistical 
significance (at 10%) of the positive effects estimated with respect to R&D investment. When 
we consider l=s and m=c, the statistical significance (at 5%) of the positive effects estimated 
with respect to Collaborations and Other firms is preserved,  provided that we accept that only 
20%  of these two discoveries are false positives, whereas a FDR of 15% is sufficient to preserve 
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statistical significance (at 5%) of the positive effect on Universities. In all the other cases, a 
FDR of 10% is sufficient to confirm the statistical significance of our findings. In particular, 
where l=c and m=u, the statistical significance (at 1%) of the positive treatment effects on 
Universities is already guaranteed by a FDR of 5%, whereas significance (at 5%) of positive 
effects on R&D and Collaborations requires the FDR to be set at 10%. Finally, where l=c and 
m=s, a FDR of 10% is enough to preserve the statistical significance (at 5%) of the positive 
effect discovered with respect to R&D. 
 
7. Do we need subsidies to collaborative R&D to stimulate R&D and networking? A brief 
discussion 
In this section, we elaborate on the results of the previous analysis, which suggest that subsidies 
for collaborative R&D and subsidies for individual R&D are used by partially different firms, 
and therefore their success depends on the type of firms they are able to attract. They also 
suggest that things do not always go as expected. 
Our findings show that, in general, policies subsidising collaborative R&D do not necessarily 
perform better than policies subsidising individual R&D. It is true that the former policy 
stimulates the participating firms to embark in R&D activities in an unsubsidised future, and 
that it does so more than the latter policy. However, the participants in the policy subsidising 
individual R&D would not have increased their R&D had they participated in the former. In 
addition, although the beneficiaries of subsidies to individual projects would have increased 
their networking had they taken the collaborative subsidy, the opposite is not true. Indeed, the 
point is that the participants in the two policies are partly different, although not enough to 
impede any ceteris paribus comparison.  
The policy supporting collaborative R&D attracts firms that are relatively more accustomed to 
networking than to internal R&D effort, and induces them to confirm such collaborative effort, 
but a classical subsidy to individual projects would be sufficient to achieve the same goal. 
Evidently, the innovation model of these firms is based on collaborations with external 
organisations, and, no matter what type of funded project they participate in, they do search for 
external collaborations. If, instead, subsidies to collaborative R&D were given to firms that are 
relatively more inclined towards an in-house innovation model and are not so accustomed to 
collaborate, then the collaboration subsidy would pave the way to future networking more than 
the subsidy to individual projects. 
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On the other hand, the subsidy to collaborative R&D stimulates R&D in firms that, prior to 
policy participation, were not accustomed to R&D investment. This suggest that, for many of 
these firms, collaboration can be a gateway to internal R&D, to the extent that they might need 
to collaborate with others in order to understand that own R&D effort is also important in order 
to get the most from collaborations (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Lokshin et al., 2008; Lin 
et al., 2012). It is possible that after having carried out some R&D activities through external 
collaborations, the firms have accumulated some internal knowledge and decide that it is worth 
to start their own R&D activities. It is also possible that some learning by interacting is at work 
here, so that the firms learn how to structure such internal activities from the partners they 
collaborate with.  
Our results highlight the importance for policymakers to choose the appropriate intervention 
given the characteristics of the targeted SMEs. If the policymakers’ aim was to expand in a 
non-transitory way the number of SMEs that perform R&D – i.e. to induce an improvement in 
the spontaneous extensive margin over time – they could target firms with modest R&D 
experience through an R&D collaboration policy, rather than implement an individual R&D 
subsidy which would likely attract firms that are already performing internal R&D and will 
continue to do so also when the subsidy is no longer there. Obviously, targeting can be difficult 
to do in practice. However, innovation intermediaries (Howells, 2006; Russo et al., 2016) that 
- in some sectors, technologies or territories - map the characteristics of firms and their skills 
could provide support in this activity.  
Instead, if the policymakers’ aim was to increase the total amount of R&D investment - i.e. to 
induce an improvement in the spontaneous intensive margin over time – they should target 
SMEs that are already R&D performers and are likely to be ready to increase their effort, and 
either type of programme could be fine. This suggests that SMEs that are already R&D 
performers may benefit more from the relief of financing constraints, rather than from the 
interorganisational learning triggered by R&D collaboration. 
Finally, if the policymakers’ aim was to increase networking by SMEs, the implementation of 
a R&D collaboration programme is likely to bring some positive results irrespective of the type 
of beneficiary firms, whereas the subsidy to individual projects is not.  
Clearly, to elaborate highly precise policy design suggestions, it would also be important to 
establish which is the intensity of policy support that stimulates further investment in different 
types of firms, including R&D experienced or unexperienced ones (Peters et al., 2017), or large 
or small firms (Bia and Mattei, 2012). However, this task goes beyond the scope of our analysis.     
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The previous results may have some implications in terms of the innovation policy mix 
(Flanagan et al., 2011). Indeed, the recognition of the fact that some interventions have different 
effects on different firms, and that some policies may be more effective than others in 
stimulating a particular effect stresses the importance of maintaining a relatively varied policy 
mix.  
 
8. Conclusions 
Our study makes an original contribution to the debate on innovation policies and its 
effectiveness. By comparing two different types of R&D policies that used the same instrument 
(a subsidy), but promoted different activities (in-house R&D investments vs collaborative 
R&D), we found that the policy supporting collaborative R&D was able to stimulate a change 
in firms’ behaviour both towards R&D investment and networking, but these different effects 
were likely to occur in different groups of firms. SMEs that, prior to policy participation, were 
less likely to collaborate with external organisations were those that could see, in an 
unsubsidised future, their propensity to networking improved by the participation in a policy 
supporting collaborative R&D. SMEs that, prior to policy participation, were less likely to 
perform internal R&D activities were those that could see, in an unsubsidised future, their 
propensity to perform some R&D improved by receiving a subsidy for collaborative R&D, thus 
raising the proportion of R&D-performing SMEs in the economy. 
Our results come from the analysis of a relatively small regional case study. Therefore, they 
should be corroborated by further empirical research conducted in other locations or regarding 
similar programmes of larger size before the last word is written on the topic. However, we 
believe that our contribution can stimulate further debate on whether, and for whom, subsidies 
to collaborative R&D are preferable to other, and maybe simpler, forms of public support to 
the innovative activity of SMEs. 
Furthermore, while we think that this issue is particularly important for SMEs, we have to 
highlight that our considerations apply to this type of firms only. Therefore, as R&D policies 
are also relevant outside this specific field, it might be interesting to analyse policies in which 
large firms are involved. 
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Table 1. Means of the background and outcome variables for firms that received the subsidy for 
collaborative R&D projects and for firms that received the subsidy for individual R&D projects and 
their untreated controls 
Variable Subsidies for collaborative projects Subsidies for individual projects 
 Treated Controls Treated Controls 
R&D-1 (1/0) 0.580 0.353 0.833 0.430 
R&D investment-1 164.021 77.271 179.823 47.340 
Universities-1 (1/0) 0.362 0.142 0.183 0.076 
Other firms-1 (1/0) 0.391 0.310 0.192 0.107 
     
Sector: food 0.072 0.059 0.017 0.006 
Sector: marble products 0.058 0.090 0.033 0.032 
Sector: textiles, clothing, shoes 0.145 0.130 0.367 0.340 
Sector: chemicals 0.043 0.031 0.033 0.027 
Sector: machinery and equipment 0.145 0.146 0.167 0.221 
Sector: electrical machineries and electronics 0.087 0.071 0.092 0.077 
Sector: automotive 0.058 0.015 0.025 0.027 
Sector: furniture 0.043 0.074 0.058 0.066 
Sector: electricity, gas, water distribution 0.014 0.012 0.008 0.002 
Sector: construction 0.058 0.037 0.017 0.008 
Sector: wholesale and retail trade 0.014 0.056 0.025 0.030 
Sector: ICT 0.087 0.093 0.033 0.057 
Sector: R&D 0.043 0.012 0.008 0.014 
Sector: business services 0.072 0.118 0.033 0.039 
Sector: other sectors 0.058 0.056 0.083 0.054 
     
Employees-1 : up to 9 0.464 0.452 0.158 0.393 
Employees-1 : 10-29 0.319 0.313 0.408 0.387 
Employees-1 : 30-49 0.101 0.167 0.367 0.188 
Employees-1: 50+ 0.116 0.068 0.067 0.032 
     
Public or private limited company (1/0) 0.667 0.328 0.983 0.987 
     
Province: Massa Carrara 0.087 0.053 0.033 0.030 
Province: Lucca 0.043 0.074 0.067 0.079 
Province: Pistoia 0.029 0.043 0.100 0.077 
Province: Florence 0.246 0.257 0.325 0.258 
Province: Livorno 0.087 0.080 0.008 0.022 
Province: Pisa 0.101 0.183 0.117 0.128 
Province: Arezzo 0.029 0.062 0.058 0.114 
Province: Siena 0.130 0.115 0.042 0.082 
Province: Grosseto 0.058 0.034 0.008 0.016 
Province: Prato 0.188 0.099 0.242 0.194 
     
OUTCOMES     
R&D (1/0) 0.652 0.378 0.817 0.448 
R&D investment 161.946 43.757 179.977 53.379 
Collaborations 0.580 0.220 0.358 0.154 
Universities 0.464 0.118 0.242 0.081 
Other firms 0.391 0.186 0.250 0.119 
     
N. of observations 69 323 120 630 
Note to table: R&D investment figures are expressed at constant prices, with base year 2001, computed using the R&D 
investment deflator provided by the Italian National Institute of Statistics. 
 
  
Table 2. Estimates of the ATTlm. Standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets  
Outcome variable Treatment vs no treatment Treatment c vs treatment s and 
viceversa 
l=c; m=u  l=s; m=u  l=c; m=s  l=s; m=c  
R&D  0.178 
(0.070)  
[0.011] 
** -0.039 
(0.049)  
[0.430] 
 0.138 
(0.056)  
[0.014] 
** -0.038 
(0.123)  
[0.761] 
R&D investment 30.801 
(19.139) 
[0.108] 
63.836 
(32.000) 
[0.046] 
** -28.451 
(22.350) 
[0.203] 
28.986 
(33.242)  
[0.383] 
Collaborations  0.144 
(0.070) 
[0.041] 
** 0.012 
(0.050) 
[0.812] 
  -0.016 
(0.068)  
[0.812] 
 
-0.305 
(0.180) 
[0.090] 
* 
Universities  0.206 
(0.072) 
[0.004] 
*** 0.021 
(0.047) 
[0.657] 
  -0.081 
(0.076)  
[0.282] 
 
-0.350 
(0.176) 
[0.046] 
** 
Other firms  0.053 
(0.063)  
[0.400] 
0.006 
(0.036)  
[0.871] 
 -0.002 
(0.052)  
[0.970] 
-0.373 
(0.173)  
[0.031] 
** 
Note to table: Statistical significance: *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
 
 
APPENDIX 
Table A – Estimated coefficients of the CBPS models 
CBPS model for: esu = Pr(T=s | X, T=s,u)   ecu = Pr(T=c | X, T=c,u)   ecs = Pr(T=c | X, T=c,s)   esc= Pr(T=s| X, T=s,c)  
                    
 Estimate  S.E. p-value  Estimate  S.E. p-value  Estimate  S.E. p-value  Estimate  S.E. p-value 
Intercept -0.823  1.420 0.562  -1.140  2.250 0.612  4.310 ** 2.110 0.041  -4.590 ** 1.870 0.014 
Universities-1 (1/0) 0.489 * 0.268 0.069  1.090 * 0.603 0.071  0.994 *** 0.268 0.000  -0.908 *** 0.271 0.001 
Other firms-1 (1/0) 0.008  0.205 0.969  0.162  0.364 0.657  1.570 *** 0.322 0.000  -1.480 *** 0.278 0.000 
R&D-1 (1/0) 1.760 *** 0.196 0.000  0.144  0.239 0.546  -2.520 *** 0.371 0.000  2.110 *** 0.374 0.000 
R&D investment-1 (cont.) 0.001  0.294 0.997  0.001  0.219 0.997  0.002  0.314 0.994  -0.002  0.286 0.995 
Sector (base: Food)                    
Marble -1.920 *** 0.224 0.000  -1.090 *** 0.377 0.004  0.166  0.364 0.649  0.503  0.327 0.124 
Fashion -2.660 *** 0.395 0.000  -0.337  0.408 0.408  -1.050  0.788 0.181  0.924  0.738 0.210 
Chemicals -2.530 *** 0.345 0.000  -0.308  0.308 0.317  0.044  0.418 0.916  0.164  0.426 0.701 
Mechanics -2.560 *** 0.166 0.000  -0.895 ** 0.436 0.040  -0.458  0.737 0.534  0.267  0.690 0.699 
Electrical machinery -2.580 *** 0.254 0.000  -0.570  0.469 0.224  -0.996  0.704 0.157  1.630 ** 0.687 0.018 
Automotive -2.050 *** 0.203 0.000  0.594 ** 0.232 0.010  1.400 *** 0.408 0.001  -1.510 *** 0.368 0.000 
Furniture -2.470 *** 0.363 0.000  -0.391  0.278 0.160  1.010 ** 0.414 0.015  -0.965 ** 0.393 0.014 
Energy and utilities -0.488 *** 0.140 0.000  -0.604 ** 0.248 0.015  -1.410 *** 0.261 0.000  1.120 *** 0.240 0.000 
Constructions -2.490 *** 0.298 0.000  0.175  0.305 0.566  -1.680 *** 0.444 0.000  1.910 *** 0.393 0.000 
Wholesale/retail trade -1.370 *** 0.193 0.000  -1.500 *** 0.306 0.000  -1.650 *** 0.315 0.000  1.850 *** 0.264 0.000 
ICT -2.740 *** 0.136 0.000  -0.738  0.474 0.120  -0.035  0.697 0.960  0.216  0.645 0.738 
R&D services -3.150 *** 0.311 0.000  0.967 ** 0.386 0.012  -0.772 ** 0.328 0.019  -0.871 *** 0.333 0.009 
Business services -2.270 *** 0.401 0.000  -1.060 ** 0.489 0.031  -2.150 *** 0.408 0.000  2.010 *** 0.413 0.000 
Other sectors -1.260 *** 0.211 0.000  -0.548  0.357 0.125  0.305  0.608 0.616  0.092  0.597 0.877 
Employees-1 (base: Up to 9)                    
10-29 employees 0.849 *** 0.307 0.006  -0.243  0.209 0.245  -0.757 ** 0.363 0.037  0.819 ** 0.407 0.044 
30-49 employees 1.480 *** 0.291 0.000  -1.330 *** 0.252 0.000  -2.010 *** 0.321 0.000  1.630 *** 0.327 0.000 
50+ employees 0.303  0.480 0.528  -0.282  0.300 0.348  -0.285  0.256 0.265  -0.198  0.245 0.418 
PPLC (1/0) -0.296  0.194 0.127  1.360 *** 0.221 0.000  -3.230 *** 0.255 0.000  3.340 *** 0.281 0.000 
Province (base: Massa Carrara)                    
Lucca -0.674  0.536 0.209  -1.240 *** 0.293 0.000  -0.071  0.330 0.831  -0.560 . 0.330 0.090 
Pistoia 0.018  0.604 0.976  -1.650 *** 0.344 0.000  -2.750 *** 0.291 0.000  3.230 *** 0.288 0.000 
Firenze 0.115  0.431 0.790  -0.835  0.508 0.100  0.133  0.462 0.773  0.225  0.401 0.575 
Livorno -0.879 ** 0.405 0.030  -1.060 *** 0.360 0.003  2.770 *** 0.329 0.000  -2.350 *** 0.307 0.000 
Pisa -0.471  0.418 0.260  -1.530 *** 0.535 0.004  -0.711  0.451 0.115  0.868 ** 0.436 0.046 
Arezzo -1.160 ** 0.547 0.034  -1.750 *** 0.419 0.000  -2.240 *** 0.293 0.000  2.660 *** 0.276 0.000 
Siena -0.896  0.596 0.133  -0.577  0.424 0.173  1.030 *** 0.354 0.004  -0.806 ** 0.338 0.017 
Grosseto -2.020 *** 0.215 0.000  -0.574  0.434 0.186  0.321  0.281 0.254  0.098  0.279 0.727 
Prato 0.121  0.788 0.877  0.483  0.348 0.166  0.321  0.427 0.452  0.354  0.362 0.328 
Note to table: Statistical significance: *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
 
  
Table B – Normalised mean differences in the covariates of alternative treatment groups, unconditional and conditional on the estimated CBPS 
 esu = Pr(T=s | X, T=s,u)  ecu = Pr(T=c | X, T=c,u)  ecs= Pr(T=c | X, T=c,s)  esc= Pr(T=s | X, T=s,c) 
 
Unconditional on 
esu 
Conditional on 
esu  
Unconditional on 
ecu 
Conditional on 
ecu  
Unconditional on 
ecs 
Conditional on 
ecs  
Unconditional on 
esc 
Conditional on 
esc 
            
Universities-1 (1/0) 0.370 0.001  0.570 0.129  0.413 0.070  -0.413 -0.126 
Other firms-1 (1/0) 0.258 0.012  0.174 0.018  0.451 0.041  -0.451 -0.120 
R&D-1 (1/0) 0.807 0.010  0.464 0.062  -0.577 -0.314  0.577 0.126 
R&D investment-1 
(cont.) 0.744 0.086  0.415 0.175  -0.062 -0.120  0.062 -0.174 
Food 0.097 0.022  0.055 -0.005  0.273 0.151  -0.273 0.026 
Marble 0.010 -0.006  -0.114 -0.012  0.122 -0.086  -0.122 0.018 
Fashion 0.057 -0.008  0.044 0.017  -0.490 -0.065  0.490 0.379 
Chemicals 0.039 -0.003  0.070 0.016  0.054 0.133  -0.054 0.073 
Mechanics -0.133 -0.007  -0.002 -0.021  -0.059 -0.193  0.059 -0.410 
Electrical machinery 0.053 0.011  0.060 0.000  -0.016 -0.038  0.016 -0.048 
Automotive -0.012 -0.003  0.283 0.151  0.174 -0.005  -0.174 -0.170 
Furniture -0.032 -0.003  -0.122 -0.008  -0.066 0.047  0.066 0.064 
Energy and utilities 0.131 0.148  0.019 -0.013  0.060 0.079  -0.060 0.049 
Constructions 0.091 0.013  0.105 -0.015  0.235 0.206  -0.235 0.020 
Wholesale/retail trade -0.030 0.000  -0.192 -0.006  -0.073 -0.079  0.073 -0.061 
ICT -0.105 0.000  -0.020 -0.016  0.239 -0.013  -0.239 -0.082 
R&D services -0.051 0.001  0.234 -0.004  0.244 0.044  -0.244 -0.016 
Business services -0.032 -0.003  -0.144 -0.001  0.183 0.121  -0.183 -0.160 
Other sectors 0.126 -0.020  0.010 -0.026  -0.097 -0.011  0.097 0.171 
Up to 9 employees -0.545 -0.007  0.024 0.020  0.699 0.342  -0.699 -0.170 
10-29 employees 0.044 0.004  0.013 -0.011  -0.184 -0.230  0.184 0.039 
30-49 employees 0.434 -0.011  -0.181 -0.031  -0.596 -0.149  0.596 0.133 
50+ employees 0.185 0.028  0.180 0.024  0.177 0.051  -0.177 -0.042 
PPLC (1/0) -0.035 -0.005  0.694 0.063  -0.932 -0.828  0.932 0.024 
Massa Carrara 0.019 0.045  0.135 -0.004  0.227 0.095  -0.227 -0.053 
Lucca -0.046 0.000  -0.122 -0.009  -0.099 -0.066  0.099 -0.193 
Pistoia 0.083 -0.004  -0.072 -0.007  -0.270 -0.085  0.270 0.192 
Firenze 0.152 -0.005  -0.024 -0.031  -0.172 -0.068  0.172 -0.087 
Livorno -0.099 -0.001  0.024 0.061  0.415 0.285  -0.415 -0.028 
Pisa -0.034 0.007  -0.217 -0.015  -0.048 -0.261  0.048 0.042 
Arezzo -0.181 -0.004  -0.143 0.005  -0.137 -0.116  0.137 -0.225 
Siena -0.153 -0.002  0.049 -0.005  0.338 0.232  -0.338 -0.008 
Grosseto -0.062 -0.003  0.125 -0.012  0.308 0.280  -0.308 0.018 
Prato 0.118 -0.011  0.280 0.031  -0.128 -0.022  0.128 0.203 
 
 
 
